Abstract-Computer system reliability is conventionally modeled and analyzed using techniques such as fault tree analysis and reliability block diagrams (RBDs), which provide static representations of system reliability properties. A recent extension to RBDs, called dynamic RBDs (DRBD), defines a framework for modeling the dynamic reliability behavior of computer-based systems. However, analyzing a DRBD model in order to locate and identify design errors, such as a deadlock error or faulty state, is not trivial when done manually. A feasible approach to verifying it is to develop its formal model and then analyze it using programmatic methods. In this paper, we first define a reliability markup language that can be used to formally describe DRBD models. Then, we present an algorithm that automatically converts a DRBD model into a colored Petri net. We use a case study to illustrate the effectiveness of our approach and demonstrate how system properties of a DRBD model can be verified using an existing Petri net tool. Our formal modeling approach is compositional; thus, it provides a potential solution to automated verification of DRBD models. 
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N OUR modern society, there is an increasing reliance on computer-based systems that control critical infrastructures such as telecommunication networks, banking systems, and nuclear power plants. Such infrastructures are critical because the failure of the supporting computer-based systems (e.g., interrupted phone service, financial loss, and nuclear meltdown) can be catastrophic [1] . Therefore, ensuring the reliability of such systems has become a growing need in the computing world. There are many existing methods that can be used to evaluate a system's reliability, such as measuring a system's mean time to failure. In order to efficiently evaluate or predicate a system's reliability performance, an effective system reliability model is required. Most reliability modeling approaches are based on statistical methods. Their typical examples are reliability block diagram (RBD), fault tree analysis (FTA), and Markov chains [2] . The aforementioned methods, however, can only provide system reliability models where a system component must be either active or failed; thus, they are very limited in their ability to accurately model a system's dependence relationships and dynamic reliability properties. Dynamic FTA (DFTA) is another modeling tool that can support modeling a functional dependence in a system, where the failure of a component causes some other dependent components to become inaccessible or unusable [3] . However, DFTA cannot be used to model a general state-based dependence relationship between components, e.g., a state-based dependence where the activation of a component causes the deactivation of a dependent one.
Recently, an extension to RBD, called dynamic RBD (DRBD) [4] , [5] , was introduced with new controller constructs that support modeling dynamic, dependent, and redundant relationships between components in a computer-based system. Although it has been shown that the DRBD approach is very effective in modeling a system's dynamic reliability properties, subtle flaws in it can be easily introduced due to its modeling complexity. Therefore, formal verification of a DRBD model is an essential step in developing a correct system reliability model for the evaluation of a system's reliability. In our recent work, we demonstrated some preliminary results on how to formally verify a DRBD model using colored Petri nets (CPNs) [4] , [5] , which provide the formal semantics for DRBD models. The approach follows the basic philosophy of recent efforts on converting a Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagram to Petri nets for formal verification [6] . However, the proposed approach is not compositional for formal modeling and does not provide a generalized solution to automatically convert a DRBD model into CPN. In this paper, we present an algorithm that supports automatic conversion of a DRBD model into CPN. Hence, DRBD's automatic verification can be accomplished by analyzing the state space of the CPN using existing CPN Tools. Note that, since our proposed formal modeling approach is compositional, our approach scales with the sizes of DRBD models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the related efforts in reliability modeling. Section III provides a formal definition of DRBD with its embedded state-based RBD (SRBD). In order to efficiently process DRBD models, an extensible markup language (XML)-based language, called the reliability markup language (RML), is introduced to represent a DRBD model in XML format. Section IV outlines the procedures to convert DRBD into CPN. Section V provides a case study that illustrates how to create a DRBD model and convert it into a CPN model for formal analysis. Finally, Section VI presents the conclusions and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Reliability modeling is an integral step in creating reliable and fault-resistant computer-based systems. Currently, many industries require that some form of qualitative system reliability analysis be integrated into the design phase of a computer-based system [3] . One of the major analysis approaches for system reliability is FTA, which provides a detailed analysis of a system's failure probabilities. Fault trees are logic diagrams that depict potential critical events within a system. A fault tree model represents the relationship between a critical event and the reasons for the event's occurrence, such as specific component failures [7] . Since FTA does not account for dynamic system properties, it is extended into DFTA in order to model dynamic relationships between components [3] , [8] . DFTA introduces additional gates for modeling sequential and sparing behavior, but it has limited ability to model complex systems that involve dynamic component dependence such as a general state-based dependence [4] . On the other hand, an RBD represents a network of system components and their connections [2] . The network consists of an input point and output point, a number of blocks representing system components, and multiple paths from the input point to the output point. The multiple paths represent successful system operations, where an interruption of these paths may lead to the failure of the whole system [9] . Therefore, an RBD model represents the static topology of a computer-based system's reliability, where the topology can be a serial, parallel, or hybrid structure. Contrary to FTA, RBD models are success-oriented networks that describe the function of a system by probabilistic means [2] . Component blocks in an RBD are arranged to illustrate the proper combinations of working components that keep the entire system operational.
Failure of a component can be represented by removing the component as well as its connections with other components from the network. When a sufficient number of components in a system fail, the whole system may also fail if there is no connection between the input and output points.
Additional related work on system reliability modeling can be summarized as follows. The symbolic hierarchical automated reliability and performance evaluator (SHARPE) tool expands the use of Markov models in reliability verification of computer systems [10] . Sahner and Trivedi [10] recognize that Markov models can capture important dynamic system behavior but may also grow exponentially with the number of system components. Their research produces a hierarchical modeling technique for analyzing complex reliability models, which allows for the flexibility of Markov models where necessary and retains the efficiency of combinatorial solutions where possible. Leangsuksun et al. adopt the UML technology to model the reliability of two-tier computer systems [11] . They use UML deployment diagrams to model system components and their relationships, and manually create failure and repair rate for components in order to construct statistical fault trees and Markov Chain models. The system reliability is then calculated using the SHARPE tool. Similarly, Dammag and Nissanke also propose a visual model, called Safecharts, which can be used to specify and design safety-critical systems [12] . The novel feature of Safecharts is its safety annotation that provides an explicit ordering of states according to risk levels. In order to support standards compliance testing and verification for safety-critical systems, Hsiung et al. attempt to integrate Safecharts into a Verifiable Embedded Real-Time Application Framework (VERTAF), which is an application framework for design and verification of embedded real-time software [13] . Blake et al. [14] use an extension of Markov models to specify the reliability of multiprocessor systems using parametric sensitivity analysis. Their approach creates upper and lower bounds for each system parameter of interest in order to compute the optimistic and conservative bounds for the reliability of a multiprocessor system. Similar to the FTA and RBD approaches, most of the aforementioned methods only consider a system component as a bistate component, which must be either active or failed. Therefore, they suffer from the same weakness as FTA and RBD models for modeling dynamic system reliability properties. In our previous work, we propose DRBD as an extension to RBD models [4] , [5] . New modeling constructs have been introduced and formally specified in Object-Z formalism [15] and can be used to model dynamic reliability properties of system components, e.g., state-based dependence and spare part relationships. Unlike DFTA, DRBD models are defined upon state-based components where a component can be active, standby, or failed. Thus, DRBD controlling constructs support modeling general statebased dependences. Xu et al. [5] give an introduction to DRBD models as well as additional related work on system reliability modeling.
Petri nets [16] - [18] have been widely used in industry for modeling and analyzing computer-based systems such as intelligent mobile robots and semiconductor manufacturing systems [19] , [20] . There is some related work to our approach that uses Petri nets for deadlock detection and avoidance. Fanti and Zhou [21] give a survey on state-of-the-art modeling and deadlock control methods for discrete manufacturing systems based on digraphs, automata, and Petri net approaches. They present the updated results in the areas of deadlock prevention, detection and recovery, and avoidance. Li et al. [22] develop a methodology to synthesize supervisors for a special class of Petri nets that can be used to model flexible manufacturing systems. In their research, a mixed-integer-programming-based deadlock detection technique is used to find minimal siphons efficiently in a plant model. Hsieh [23] formulates a faulttolerant deadlock avoidance controller synthesis problem for assembly processes based on a class of Petri nets. He proposes a fault-tolerant deadlock avoidance approach that consists of two algorithms, namely, a nominal algorithm to avoid deadlocks for nominal system state and an exception handling algorithm to deal with resource failures. Wu and Zhou [24] propose a novel control policy for deadlock avoidance for an automated guided vehicle system using colored resource-oriented Petri nets, and the complexity of deadlock avoidance for the whole system is bounded by the complexity in controlling the system. More recently, Li et al. summarize a variety of Petri-netbased deadlock prevention policies for flexible manufacturing systems [25] . Their work facilitates engineers in choosing a suitable method for their industrial applications. They further suggest developing polynomial algorithms in order to improve the computational efficiency of deadlock prevention methods that are based on the theory of regions.
Although the aforementioned Petri-net-based approaches can be used for deadlock detection and avoidance, they are not aimed at modeling system reliability. A few efforts on reliability modeling using Petri nets can be summarized as follows. Bobbio et al. [26] use the generalized stochastic Petri net (GSPN) to support system dependability analysis. Their approach involves converting fault trees into a GSPN model for the purpose of obtaining both qualitative and quantitative analysis results for the modeled system. Everdij and Blom [27] develop piecewise deterministic Markov processes (PDP) models using dynamically colored Petri nets (DCPNs). They show that DCPN has similar modeling power to PDP and is more powerful than deterministic and stochastic Petri nets. Petri nets are also applied in safety analysis of a system as shown by Leveson and Stolzy, where Petri nets are used to design and analyze the safety and fault tolerance of a system [28] . By using timed Petri nets, they prove that paths to high-risk states can be removed based on reachability analysis. Buy and Sloan [29] propose a method to automatically analyze the timing properties of concurrent systems. Their method uses simple time Petri nets to analyze concurrent software systems developed in Ada. Ghezzi et al. [30] introduce a high-level Petri net formalism, called ER nets (environment/relationship nets), to model time-critical software systems. They prove that ER nets can provide a satisfactory solution to analyzing the timing and functionality of such systems. While the aforementioned approaches are similar to our research efforts using Petri nets, they are not concerned with formalizing dynamic reliability properties of a computer system, such as state-based dependence. Furthermore, instead of providing quantitative analysis of system reliability directly using Petri nets, our approach currently focuses on using CPNs [31] to verify the correctness of a DRBD model, namely, the safety properties and liveness properties [32] of the corresponding system. Although there are many previous efforts for formal modeling and analysis of various systems using Petri nets [33] - [37] , automated system modeling using CPNs is rare. As we demonstrate in the case study in Section V, it is vital to provide an automated mechanism to ensure the correctness of a DRBD model because a DRBD model can become complicated when dynamic reliability properties are involved.
III. DRBD
The novelty of DRBD is its ability to model dynamic system reliability behaviors such as state-based dependence and redundancy [4] . The DRBD approach introduces new controller blocks, such as state-based dependence controller (SDEP) and spare part controller (SPARE) for modeling statebased dependence and spare part relationships, respectively. A DRBD model consists of an SRBD and a number of controller blocks. SRBD is an extension to RBD where each component is associated with a state representing the activeness of the component in the system. An SRBD model defines the static structure of a DRBD model, while the controller blocks model the dynamic reliability properties of the system. The DRBD designs described in this paper follow the notations and constructs introduced in [4] and [5] .
A. SRBD
An SRBD is a network of dynamic system components called structural components. As defined in Fig. 1 in a Backus-Naur form (BNF), a structural component can be one of the three component types, namely, simple, parallel, and serial components. Simple components are a special case of structural components, which represent atomic and physical system components with a state. A component with a state can be formally defined as a finite-state machine consisting of three states, namely, "Active," "Standby," and "Failed," which may change at runtime. An "Active" component is an online component that is actively performing tasks. A component in a "Standby" state is ready to perform tasks, but it is still waiting to be set online. A "Failed" component is no longer online and cannot work properly. The two other structural component types are used to define the topology of a DRBD. In Fig. 1 , parallel and serial components are defined as sets of structural components sandwiched between the tags <parallel> · · ·</parallel> and <serial> · · ·</serial>, respectively. The state of a structural component can be logically determined by aggregating the states of its contained components. Contained structural components within a parallel component (i.e., simple or serial components) can operate in parallel; therefore, only one of them must be in an "Active" state for the parallel component to be considered as active. A failed parallel component indicates that all of its contained structural components are in "Failed" states. Conversely, a serial component is not considered as active unless all of its contained structural components (simple or parallel component) are in "Active" states because the failure of any of its contained components leads to the failure of the whole serial component. Note that, according to the definition of SRBD in Fig. 1 , a serial component may contain only one component; thus, an SRBD with a single simple component or a single parallel component can also be viewed as a serial component. Fig. 2 shows an example of an SRBD model. In this example, two simple components (C1 and C2) are contained within a serial component, which itself is contained in a parallel component along with a third simple component (C3). Note that, if not specified explicitly, we assume that all simple components are initially in "Active" states.
B. DRBD Controller Blocks
Controller blocks defined in a DRBD model can be used to model dynamic relationships between components. Fig. 3 shows the formal definition of a DRBD model with two types of controllers, namely, spare and state controllers, in a BNF format. Note that additional types of controllers, e.g., a load sharing block [5] , can also be formally specified in a similar way.
A spare controller can be used to model redundant system behavior, where n spare components (n > 0) are used to back up a primary component. The deactivation or failure of the primary component (i.e., the primary event) triggers the first spare component to enter an "Active" state. Similarly, the deactivation or failure of the first spare component triggers the second spare one to enter an "Active" state, and so on. The activation of a spare component is called a spare event, while the event of deactivation or failure of a spare component is implicitly defined. A spare component is a simple component with an ordering number and a sparing configuration. The ordering number of a spare component is defined as a natural number, and the standby spare component with the lowest ordering number should always be activated first when a primary component or a spare component is deactivated or failed. The sparing configuration signifies the "activeness" of a spare part. There are three types of sparing configurations, namely, hot, cold, and warm. A hot spare component operates in synchrony with a primary (i.e., online) component and is prepared to take over at any time, while a cold spare component is unpowered until needed to replace a faulty component [38] . A warm spare component is a tradeoff between hot and cold configurations in terms of reconfiguration time and power consumption. Without loss of generality, in this paper, we assume that all spare components used in our examples are cold spares. Fig. 4 (a) shows a SPARE controller block with a primary component P 1 and two cold spare components S1 and S2 with ordering numbers 1 and 2, respectively. In this example, the first spare part S1 is activated if P 1 fails, and the failure of S1 leads to the activation of the second spare component S2. Note that the capitalized letter "C" at the upper right corner of blocks S1 and S2 denotes that both are cold spares.
On the other hand, an SDEP controller block models the state-based dependence relationships between components in a system. With an SDEP controller block, a trigger event due to change of state on a trigger component leads to target events, which are state changes on target components. Both a trigger and a target component can be a simple or spare component, and the number of target components must be greater than zero. An event can be one of the three types, namely, "Activation," "Deactivation," and "Failure." An "Activation" event happening on a simple or spare component causes it to enter an "Active" state. Similarly, a "Deactivation" or "Failure" event happening on a simple or spare component causes the component to enter a "Standby" or "Failed" state, respectively. Fig. 4(b) shows an example in which the activation of C1 leads to the deactivation and failure of C2 and C3, respectively. Note that both C2 and C3 are initially assumed in "Active" states, and otherwise, the states of C2 and C3 may remain unchanged when C1 is activated.
C. DRBD Model in RML
The RML is an XML-based schema defined to formally describe the components, structure, and dynamic behavior of a DRBD model. RML is designed based on the BNF definition of DRBD models. All components and controllers in a DRBD model have nested RML elements that describe their properties according to their respective BNF definitions. Fig. 5 shows a DRBD model with three parallel simple components C1-C3 which are dependent on each other. The SDEP controller block specifies that the deactivation of C1 leads to the failure of C2 as well as the activation of C3. The figure also shows the XML-based representation of the DRBD model in RML. An RML file uses the opening <rml> tag to signify the beginning of a DRBD definition. Following it, an SRBD model is defined as the top structural component, called MAIN component. Component MAIN is defined as a serial component within the tags <serialComponent> and </serialComponent>, which may contain any number of structural components (simple or parallel ones). In this example, the only structural component contained in MAIN is a parallel component that is defined within the tags <parallelComponent> and </parallelComponent>. The parallel component has an identification of PCom, which consists of three simple components C1-C3. Each of them is defined within the tags <simpleComponent> and </simpleComponent> and has an initial state defined inside the <initialState> · · · </initialState> tags. In this example, the parallel component consists of simple ones only, but in a more general case, it may contain serial components. Similarly, a serial component may also consist of any number of simple or parallel components.
After an SRBD has been defined, controllers are to be added into the RML file using specific XML tags. For example, state controller C1_SDEP can be defined within the <stateController> and </stateController> tags as shown in Fig. 5 . Inside the C1_SDEP definition, the trigger and target events can be defined using <triggerEvent> · · · </triggerEvent> and <targetEvent> · · · </targetEvent> tags, respectively. Corresponding to (D, F ) and (D, A) state-based dependences between components C1 and C2, and C1 and C3, respectively, we define the trigger event that occurs on C1 with a Deactivation event and also two target events that occur on C2 and C3 with the events of Failure and Activation, respectively. When both SRBD model and controllers have been defined, the RML file is ended by the closing tag </rml>.
The motivation and major advantage of using RML to describe a DRBD model are to allow access and mutation of a DRBD model as an XML document. XML documents not only support a standard information encoding and storage format but also allow programmers to use that information in a standard way [39] . Currently, two dominant APIs for processing XML-based documents are Simple API for XML (SAX) and Document Object Model (DOM). The SAX specification defines a low-level API, which is an event-based approach that can parse through XML data and call handler functions when certain parts of the document are found. On the other hand, the DOM specification defines a tree-based approach to processing XML data. Based on the hierarchical structure of the XML data, the DOM approach creates an internal tree, which can be navigated at runtime. For efficiency reasons, in this paper, we have adopted the DOM specification to process RML files.
IV. CONVERSION OF DRBD MODELS INTO CPN
In order to verify the correctness of a DRBD model, we need to convert it into CPN using a two-step procedure. First, the embedded SRBD of a DRBD model is converted into a CPN model. Then, the controller blocks are converted into Petri nets and added into the converted CPN model. The following sections give the detailed descriptions for the conversion procedures. Note that the CPN models described in the following sections employ CPN-ML, which is a powerful programming language of CPN as implemented in CPN Tools [40] . We assume that readers have the basic knowledge of CPN-ML [41] .
A. Conversion of SRBD Into CPN
Before we present the algorithm to convert the embedded SRBD of a DRBD model into a CPN model, we first describe how to convert each type of structural components in an SRBD into CPN. In order to model the component state, a colored token called a state token is introduced, which has three possible values, i.e., "Active," "Standby," and "Failed." The movement of these tokens in a CPN model signifies the state changes of the components in the DRBD model. Fig. 6 shows the conversion of a simple component into a CPN, called simple-component CPN.
A simple-component CPN contains two places, i.e., C1_start and C1_up. C1_start contains an initial token with color "Active" (denoted as 1`Active in Fig. 6 ), indicating that its initial state is active. When C1 remains active and the other input place to transition in_C1 also contains an "Active" token (we do not show the other input place of transition in_C1 in Fig. 6 , but it is connected to in_C1 through the Input Connection of the simple-component CPN), in_C1 may fire. Its firing deposits an "Active" token into C1_up, indicating that C1 is active. The "Active" token in C1_up can be further passed along to other modules through Output Connection (Active). On the other hand, if transition C1_destruct fires while C1 is active, the "Active" token in C1_start is removed, and a "Failed" token is deposited into C1_start. In this case, transition C1_fail is enabled and can fire. When C1_fail fires, it generates a "true" token, indicating that C1 fails. The generated "true" token can be further passed to other modules through Output Connection (Failed).
A serial-component CPN is a set of serially connected structural component CPNs. Fig. 7 shows a serial component in DRBD, containing two simple components C1 and C2, and its CPN representation.
Similar to a simple-component CPN, a serial-component CPN has an interface that consists of an Input Connection (through its in_Serial transition) and two Output Connections (through its Serial_up place and Serial_fail transition). When transition in_Serial receives an "Active" token through Input Connection, it can fire, and its firing deposits an "Active" token into place Serial_start. This token enables transition in_C1 if place C1_start also contains an "Active" token.
The behavior of C1 in Fig. 7 is the same as that of the simple component C1 in Fig. 6 . Note that both C1 and C2 in Fig. 7 are modeled in exactly the same way as C1 in Fig. 6 . When both places C1_up and C2_start contain an "Active" token, transition in_C2 is enabled, and its firing deposits an "Active" token into C2_up. The "Active" token in C2_up further enables transition in_Serial_up and may place an "Active" token in place Serial_up. Similar to a simple-component CPN, an "Active" token in Serial_up indicates that the serial component is functioning properly. The firing procedure also implies that the serial component is active only when both of its contained simple components, C1 and C2, are active.
On the other hand, when either C1 or C2 fails, transition C1_fail or C2_fail can fire. When either fires, a "true" token is deposited into place Serial_down, which enables transition Serial_fail. Firing Serial_fail generates a "true" token, indicating that the serial component cannot function properly due to the failure of its contained components. The firing procedure also implies that the serial component becomes failed when either C1 or C2 fails. Note that, when both C1 and C2 fail, only one of the transitions, either C1_fail or C2_fail, can fire because place Serial_inhibit limits the capacity of place Serial_down to one; thus, Serial_fail will not accidentally fire twice.
A parallel component contains a set of structural components (simple or serial components) that are connected in parallel. Fig. 8 shows the DRBD model of a parallel component with two simple components C1 and C2, and its CPN representation. Similar to a simple-component and a serial-component CPN, a parallel-component CPN has an Input Connection (through its in_P ara transition) and two Output Connections (through its P ara_up place and P ara_fail transition).
Components C1 and C2 in Fig. 8 are modeled in the same way as shown in Fig. 6 . When Input Connection passes an "Active" token to transition in_P ara, its firing deposits an "Active" token into place P ara_start, which enables both in_C1 and in_C2. When C1 or C2 is active, transition in_C1 or in_C2 may fire and can deposit an "Active" token in place C1_up or C2_up, respectively. The "Active" token in either C1_up or C2_up enables P ara_C1 or P ara_C2 and eventually leads to an "Active" token in place P ara_up. Similar to a serialcomponent CPN, an "Active" token in P ara_up indicates that the parallel component can function properly. Note that, at any time, only one of the transitions (either in_C1 or in_C2) may fire. Thus, the capacity of place P ara_up must be one.
On the other hand, if both C1 and C2 fail, there will be a "true" token in both places C1_down and C2_down, which enables transition in_P ara_down. Its firing deposits a "true" token into place P ara_down, which enables transition P ara_fail. Firing P ara_fail generates and passes a "true" token to other modules through Output Connection. The firing procedure implies that the parallel component is not functioning due to the failure of both C1 and C2.
It is worth noting that although, in the aforementioned examples, both serial and parallel components contain simple components only, they may contain serial or parallel components in a more general case. In such a case, CPN models can be composed in exactly the same way as described. This is because both a serial-component CPN and a parallel-component CPN have the same interface as a simple-component CPN. Thus, our conversion approach is compositional.
We now provide a recursive algorithm for automatically converting an SRBD model into a CPN model. The proposed recursive algorithm treats the previous techniques as a function that recursively expands structural components in order to derive a CPN that formally defines an entire SRBD. The algorithm is shown as a pseudocode in Fig. 9 , which is defined as a recursive function convert_Serial_Component with a parameter of type SerialComponent.
The algorithm starts with viewing an SRBD model as a serial component and creating the needed input and output connections. As defined in Fig. 1 , a serial component can contain one or more than one simple or parallel components. Thus, we use a for loop to convert each of the contained structural components. If a contained component is a simple or spare component, we convert it directly into a simple-component CPN as shown in Fig. 6 ; otherwise, if it is a parallel component, we first create the needed input and output connections for the parallelcomponent CPN and then use a for loop again to convert each of the contained structural components into a CPN. For each contained structural component in the parallel component, we check whether it is a simple or spare component. If it is a simple or spare component, we convert it directly into a simple-component CPN; otherwise, if it is a serial one, the function convert_Serial_Component is called recursively. When all contained components in a parallel component have The resulting CPN for an SRBD contains open input and output connections. In order to develop a complete CPN model for the SRBD, we introduce additional places and transitions into the SRBD CPN. As shown in Fig. 10 
B. Conversion of DRBD Controllers Into CPN
The next step in converting a DRBD model into a CPN is to convert DRBD controllers into controller CPN and add them into the CPN model developed for the embedded SRBD model in step one. A controller CPN consists of a set of transitions and arcs that connect to the start places of the corresponding simple-component CPN. Figs. 11 and 12 show the algorithms for converting a spare controller into a spare-controller CPN and converting a state controller into a state-controller CPN, respectively. Note that, in the algorithm shown in Fig. 12 , when the trigger event is deactivation, no synchronization place needs to be introduced. We now use the spare controller and state controller examples in Fig. 4 to illustrate how these algorithms work. Fig. 13 shows a spare-controller CPN for the SPARE controller block in Fig. 4(a) . The SPARE controller block models the spare part relationship between primary component P 1 and two cold spare parts S1 and S2. When P 1 fails, S1 is activated, and similarly, when S1 fails, S2 is activated. In order to model such a cascading relationship in CPN, we introduce two transitions, namely, SP C_P 1 and SP C_S1, which connect the start places of P 1 and S1 to the start places of S1 and S2, respectively. When P 1 fails and S1 is in its standby state, transition SP C_P 1 may fire, which removes the Fig. 4(a) .
"Standby" token in place S1_start and deposits an "Active" token into S1_start. This indicates that S1 changes its state from "Standby" to "Active" due to the failure of P 1. Similarly, when S1 fails, transition SP C_S1 may fire, which changes the state of S2 from "Standby" to "Active." Note that, in the sparecontroller CPN model in Fig. 13 , there are two synchronization places: SP C_sync1 and SP C_sync2. When transition SP C_P 1 (SP C_S1) fires, a unit token is deposited into place SP C_sync1 (SP C_sync2), which enables transition P 1_fail (S1_fail). Thus, SP C_sync1 (SP C_sync2) can be used to ensure that the firing of transition SP C_P 1 (SP C_S1) precedes that of transition P 1_fail (S1_fail), and the "Failed" token in place P 1_start (S1_start) will not be accidentally removed before transition SP C_P 1 (SP C_P 2) fires. Fig. 4(b) .
In a DRBD model, a state controller (i.e., an SDEP controller block) models a state-based dependence relationship between simple components. Fig. 14 shows a state-controller CPN for the SDEP controller block with a trigger component C1 and two target components C2 and C3 defined in Fig. 4(b) . The SDEP block is modeled by an SDEP transition in the statecontroller CPN, which connects the start places of the three components. When C1 becomes active and both C2 and C3 are also active, transition SDEP becomes enabled. Its firing deposits a "Standby" and a "Failed" token into places C2_start and C3_start, respectively. It also deposits a unit token into synchronization place SDEP _sync, which may enable transition in_C1 when C1_start contains an "Active" token. Thus, SDEP _sync ensures that the firing of SDEP precedes that of in_C1, and the "Active" token in place C1_start will not be accidentally removed before SDEP fires.
Note that, if the trigger event from simple component C1 is failure instead of activation, synchronization place SDEP _sync should be connected to transition C1_fail instead of in_C1. This case is shown in Fig. 15 . On the other hand, if the trigger event from C1 is deactivation, no synchronization place is needed. This is because when C1 becomes standby, neither of C1_fail and in_C1 is enabled, and SDEP is the only one enabled due to a "Standby" token in place C1_start.
Finally, the converted controller CPN models can be added into the CPN model developed for the embedded SRBD model in step one. This procedure can be done by merging the start places (e.g., P 1_start in Fig. 13 ) and status transitions (e.g., P 1_fail in Fig. 13 and in_C1 in Fig. 14) from the controller CPN models with the corresponding places and transitions defined in the CPN model for the embedded SRBD model. We illustrate this process in a case study presented in the following section.
V. CASE STUDY: CONVERSION OF DRBD INTO CPN FOR FORMAL VERIFICATION
A. DRBD Model of a Redundant Generator
Consider a coast guard vessel whose electrical system is powered by three generators: primary, backup, and secondary backup one used only for emergency. The primary and backup generators can provide the vessel with enough kilowatts (kW) output to power all electrical components and equipment, while the emergency generator has less wattage output and can supply only power to the vessel's essential equipment such as navigational lights, emergency lights, and other equipment that keeps the engine running. Initially, only the primary generator is running, and the other two generators are in standby states. At runtime, if the primary one fails, it automatically triggers the backup one to switch from standby to online. Similarly, if the backup one fails, the emergency generator is activated. Connected in series to the generators is a power bus that is a series of circuit breakers that feed electricity from a generator to the electrical components on the ship. The power bus in this system contains two parallel buses, namely, main and emergency buses. The main bus contains the breakers for all of the ship's components, while the emergency bus powers only the vessel's essential equipment. Fig. 16 shows the DRBD model for the system described earlier. It consists of two parallel components that are connected in series. The first parallel component contains the generator components and is composed of the primary generator (P G1), backup generator (BG1), and emergency generator (BG2). P G1 is a simple component, initially in an "Active" state, while BG1 and BG2 are cold spare components, which are initially in "Standby" states. A spare controller (SPARE) is introduced to model the cascading failure of P G1 and BG1. If P G1 fails, BG1 is activated, and upon failure of BG1, BG2 enters its "Active" state. The second parallel component models the power buses. The two power buses, namely, main bus (MB) and emergency bus (EB), are represented in the DRBD model as simple components within the power bus parallel component. Since the emergency generator BG2 does not output enough wattage to power MB when it enters its "Active" state, MB must be deactivated and EB must enter its "Active" state. This state-based dependence between BG2 and the power buses is modeled by an SDEP state controller.
B. Automatic Generation of a CPN Model
According to the algorithm presented in Section IV, the DRBD model of the redundant generator system can be converted into a CPN model as shown in Fig. 17 . The first structural component within MAIN serial component is a parallel component representing the set of generators, denoted as GEN . During the conversion of GEN into CPN, CPN models corresponding to each generator (P G1, BG1, or BG2) are first created and then connected in parallel according to the algorithm. These parallel connections are shown in Fig. 17 , where each generator CPN initially contains "Active," "Standby," and "Standby" tokens in their start places P G1_start, BG1_start, and BG2_start, respectively. When any of these components is active, there is an "Active" token in one of places P G1_up, BG1_up, and BG2_up, which enables transitions GEN _P G1, GEN _BG1, and GEN _BG2, respectively. When one of these transitions fires, an "Active" token is deposited into place GEN _up, indicating that the GEN parallel component is active. On the other hand, if all of the places P G1_down, BG1_down, and BG2_down contain a "true" token, transition in_GEN _down may fire, which deposits a "true" token into place GEN _down. This enables transition GEN _fail, and its firing generates a "true" token, indicating that the GEN structural component is not functioning.
The second structural component contained in MAIN is parallel component BU S representing the parallel power bus circuit in the DRBD model shown in Fig. 16 . The conversion of BU S into CPN follows the same procedure as for parallel component GEN . When either of the buses is active, an "Active" token is deposited into place BU S_up, indicating that BU S is active. On the other hand, when both buses fail (indicated by a "true" token in both places MB_down and EB_down), transition in_BU S_down may fire, and its firing leads to a "true" token in place BU S_down. When the bus is down, transition BU S_fail may fire, and its firing generates a "true" token that can be passed to place MAIN_down.
Once GEN and BU S are converted into their corresponding CPN models, they can be connected serially within component MAIN. The serial connection between the two structural components is simply made by connecting place GEN _up from parallel-component CPN of GEN to transition in_BU S from parallel-component CPN of BU S. In addition, since GEN is the first serially connected structural component, its transition in_GEN is connected to place MAIN_start. Similarly, since BU S is the last serial component, its place BU S_up is connected to transition in_MAIN_up. On the other hand, both transitions GEN _fail and BU S_fail are connected to place MAIN_down. However, due to inhibitor place MAIN_inhibit, only one of the transitions may fire, which ensures that the capacity of MAIN_down is one.
In step two of the conversion, the DRBD controllers are converted into CPN and added into the CPN model developed in step one. In this example, we have two controllers, i.e., SPARE and SDEP controller blocks. The SPARE controller block models the redundant behaviors of the three generators (P G1, BG1, and BG2) and is converted into two transitions SP C_P G1 and SP C_BG1 in the spare-controller CPN. The transition SP C_P G1 connects P G1_start and BG1_start, which is responsible for activating the backup generator BG1 when primary generator P G1 fails. Similarly, transition SP C_BG1 connects BG1_start and BG2_start, which is responsible for activating emergency generator BG2 when backup generator BG1 fails. Note that synchronization place SP C_sync1 is used to ensure that a "Failed" token in place P G1_start (BG1_start) is not removed before transition SP C_P G1 (SP C_BG1) fires. The state controller block SDEP in Fig. 16 , which deactivates the main power bus MB and activates the emergency power bus EB when BG2 is activated, is converted into transition SDEP in the state-controller CPN. The SDEP transition connects the three start places of components BG2, MB and EB, and its firing deposits a "Standby" token and an "Active" token into places MB_start and EB_start, respectively. SDEP _sync is used to ensure that the "Active" token is not accidentally removed before transition SDEP fires.
In order to illustrate automatic generation of a CPN model from a DRBD model, we have implemented a prototype application that transforms an input file of DRBD model in RML into an output file of CPN model in XML that can be recognized by CPN Tools [40] . The prototype was implemented in Java 5, which provides a simple interface that can load an RML file and output a converted CPN model in XML. We use DOM technology [42] to parse an input RML file into a tree representing the corresponding DRBD structure for efficient processing FIG. 14 and conversion. For details about the implementation of the prototype, refer to [43] .
C. Analysis of DRBD Model Using CPN Tools
Design errors in a DRBD model can be discovered by analyzing the state space of the CPN model converted from the DRBD model. By using an existing Petri net tool, called CPN Tools [40] , we can generate a report detailing the properties of the CPN model in Fig. 17 . The report, shown as the analysis results in Table I , indicates that the full state space (or called the occurrence graph) can be generated from the CPN model in zero second (almost instantaneously), which consists of 288 nodes and 763 arcs. Similarly, the CPN Tools can be used to further generate a strongly connected component (Scc) graph from the occurrence graph. The generated Scc graph consists of 288 nodes and 744 arcs and plays an important role for analysis. The report also indicates that there are three deadlock states in the CPN model, namely, S 78 , S 171 , and S 282 . They imply that transition SY S_up or SY S_down of the CPN model cannot eventually fire; therefore, there must be some design errors in the DRBD model. By tracing these deadlocks using CPN Tools, we find the following firing sequences that lead to them: From firing sequence σ 1 , it is easy to see that S 78 is due to the failure of the main bus MB when the primary generator P G1 is functioning. Although emergency bus EB is in the "Standby" state and can provide services if activated, no such spare part relationship between MB and EB exists in either the DRBD model or corresponding CPN model. The firing sequence σ 2 shows the similar situation when P G1 fails, and backup generator BG1 is active, but MB fails and EB is still in a "Standby" state. The firing sequence σ 3 illustrates a different scenario. When both P G1 and BG1 fail, and emergency generator BG2 is activated, MB and EB will be deactivated and activated, respectively, due to the SDEP relationship between BG2 and bus components MB and EB. However, at this point of time, when EB fails, the BU S parallel component cannot be considered as "failed" because MB is still in a "Standby" state. Therefore, in the parallel-component CPN of BU S, neither place BU S_up will receive an "Active" token nor transition BU S_fail can fire. This leads to another deadlock situation in the CPN because no token will be deposited into either of places MAIN_down and MAIN_up. As a consequence, none of transitions SY S_down and SY S_up can fire eventually.
In order to correct the design errors in the DRBD model, we need to define EB as a spare part of MB by introducing a SPARE block that links MB and EB and labeling the links from MB to SPARE and from SPARE to EB by D | F and A, respectively. This implies that, when MB is deactivated or failed, EB is automatically activated. As a result, in Fig. 16 , the link from SDEP to EB labeled by A is no longer needed and can be deleted. Now, based on the revised version of the DRBD model, we fix the CPN model in Fig. 17 [5] . Refer to [44] for more examples of system properties that can be formally verified using existing Petri net tools.
It is worth noting that the correct CPN model we developed for the redundant generator system can be further used for analysis and evaluation of system reliability properties. Such analysis and evaluation techniques are demonstrated in [26] and [27] . The detailed description of reliability evaluation on the CPN model is beyond the scope of this paper but will be presented in our future work.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
There is a growing demand to build reliable and stable computer systems. Building these types of systems involves creating an accurate and correct system reliability model. A reliability model ensures that the constructed system has the desired measures of reliability determined by the system designers. This paper has presented a procedure for formal modeling and verifying DRBD for computer-based systems. In the procedure, a DRBD model is first converted into CPN. Then, existing CPN Tools are used to verify the behavioral properties of the DRBD model, where design flaws and faulty states of the DRBD model can be identified by tracing the deadlock states of the CPN model. Our case study shows that the proposed approach supports effective detection and tracing of subtle design errors in a DRBD model and can provide a potential solution to automated verification of DRBD models. For future work, we plan to investigate automated verification approaches for safety-critical system analysis. We will consider the use of compositional time Petri nets [45] to model time-sensitive dependence between components in a system. We will also study how to analyze a DRBD model for system reliability evaluation and develop a comprehensive development environment that supports editing, verification, analysis, and evaluation of DRBD models for complex and large computer-based systems. 
